Pemerintahan AS secara berturut-turut sejak revolusi Islam Iran pada tahun 1979 memandang Iran sebagai ancaman potensial terhadap sekutu dan kekuatan AS di Teluk Persia dan Timur Tengah yang lebih luas dan berupaya membatasi kemampuan strategisnya. Semakin besarnya visibilitas unsur-unsur moderat di Iran sejak tahun 1997 membuat Amerika Serikat berusaha melibatkan Iran dalam dialog resmi pemerintah, namun pemerintahan Clinton dan George W. Bush tidak mengurangi upaya AS untuk menolak teknologi senjata konvensional dan senjata pemusnah massal (WMD) yang dikembangkan Iran. Kelompok moderat di Iran tampaknya melihat ancaman regional terhadap Iran seperti halnya kelompok garis keras di Iran dan tidak melakukan upaya nyata untuk mengekang upaya Iran untuk memperoleh senjata pemusnah massal. Sekalipun para pemimpin moderat berusaha melakukan hal tersebut, mereka telah dikalahkan dalam hal pertahanan dan isu-isu lainnya oleh kelompok garis keras yang masih mengendalikan angkatan bersenjata, badan keamanan dalam negeri, peradilan, dan badan-badan pengambil keputusan penting. Di masa lalu, Iran pada umumnya tidak memiliki keterampilan dalam negeri untuk memproduksi senjata konvensional yang canggih atau mengembangkan senjata pemusnah massal (WMD) secara mandiri, dan salah satu tujuan Iran selama dekade terakhir adalah memperoleh teknologi dan keterampilan agar bisa mandiri. Iran telah mencapai tujuan tersebut dalam beberapa bidang, termasuk rudal balistik dan senjata kimia, namun secara keseluruhan, Iran masih bergantung pada pemasok asing. Ketergantungan ini telah memberi Amerika Serikat peluang untuk bekerja sama dengan pemasok potensial guna membendung kemampuan senjata pemusnah massal Iran. Sekutu Amerika Serikat di Eropa telah sepakat untuk tidak menjual persenjataan konvensional ke Iran, dan Amerika Serikat telah membujuk sekutunya di Eropa untuk tidak menjual teknologi apa pun yang dapat digunakan dalam bidang militer (“barang penggunaan ganda”) kepada entitas militer atau keamanan Iran. Untuk mencoba menggagalkan upaya AS, Iran telah membina hubungan dekat dengan pemasok asing yang tidak bersekutu dengan AS, terutama Rusia, Tiongkok, dan Korea Utara. Membatasi pasokan senjata dan teknologi ke Iran telah menjadi bagian penting dari agenda AS dengan ketiga negara tersebut, namun tujuan AS yang lebih mendesak dengan masing-masing negara terkadang menghambat kemampuan AS untuk menghalangi mereka membantu Iran. Iran tampaknya terus menerima teknologi penting dari ketiganya, namun upaya AS tampaknya membatasi hubungan pasokan mereka dengan Iran. Kongres dan pemerintahan berturut-turut telah mengesahkan beberapa undang-undang dan perintah eksekutif, yang sebagian besar serupa satu sama lain, yang menjatuhkan sanksi terhadap negara dan perusahaan yang menjual teknologi WMD ke Iran. Tindakan terbaru yang diberlakukan adalah Undang-Undang Nonproliferasi Iran (P.L. 106-178), yang ditandatangani pada bulan Maret 2000. Pemerintahan Clinton umumnya lebih memilih diplomasi dan keterlibatan dengan negara-negara pemasok, dan menggunakan ancaman sanksi untuk mendapatkan kerja sama pemasok. Pemerintahan Bush juga mengambil pendekatan yang sama, meskipun tampaknya lebih bersedia memberikan sanksi kepada entitas di beberapa negara pemasok dibandingkan pendahulunya. Laporan ini akan diperbarui jika diperlukan.
Successive U.S. administrations since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a potential threat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf and in the broader Middle East and have sought to limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderate elements inside Iran since 1997 led the United States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and George W. Bush Administration did not reduce U.S. efforts to deny Iran advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran’s moderates appear to see regional threats to Iran as do Iran’s hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD. Even if moderate leaders had sought to do so, they have been largely outmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal security services, the judiciary, and key decision-making bodies.
In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated conventional arms or independently develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and one of Iran’s objectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skills to become self-sufficient. Iran has come a long way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, but in the aggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreign suppliers. This dependence has given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to contain Iran’s WMD capabilities. European allies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional weaponry to Iran, and the United States has persuaded its European allies not to sell any technology that could have military applications (“dual use items”) to Iranian military or security entities.
Untuk mencoba menggagalkan upaya AS, Iran telah membina hubungan dekat dengan pemasok asing yang tidak bersekutu dengan AS, terutama Rusia, Tiongkok, dan Korea Utara. Membatasi pasokan senjata dan teknologi ke Iran telah menjadi bagian penting dari agenda AS dengan ketiga negara tersebut, namun tujuan AS yang lebih mendesak dengan masing-masing negara terkadang menghambat kemampuan AS untuk menghalangi mereka membantu Iran. Iran tampaknya terus menerima teknologi penting dari ketiganya, namun upaya AS tampaknya membatasi hubungan pasokan mereka dengan Iran.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Pengalaman Iran selama perang dengan Irak (1980-1988) tampaknya meyakinkan para pemimpin Iran untuk meningkatkan kemampuan Iran dalam mengembangkan dan mengirimkan senjata pemusnah massal (WMD). Iran mengaitkan kekalahannya dalam perang itu sebagian karena kemampuan senjata pemusnah massal Irak yang lebih unggul. Iran menembakkan rudal Scud yang dipasok Korea Utara ke Baghdad selama perang Iran-Irak, namun pembalasan Irak menunjukkan bahwa kemampuan teknologi rudal Baghdad jauh melebihi kemampuan Iran selama perang itu. Irak, dengan bantuan asing, mampu memperluas jangkauan rudal yang dipasok Soviet hingga mencapai Teheran, sekitar 400 mil dari perbatasan Irak-Iran. Irak menggunakan senjata kimia dalam jumlah yang jauh lebih besar, dan memiliki dampak yang lebih besar, terhadap Iran dibandingkan Iran menggunakan senjata kimia sebagai pembalasan. Setelah perang Teluk Persia tahun 1991, ketika inspeksi PBB terhadap program WMD Irak dimulai, Iran dan seluruh dunia mengetahui bahwa Irak mungkin dalam waktu dua tahun sudah mencapai kemampuan senjata nuklir.
Iran’s missile capabilities have made significant strides since the first, unsuccessful, test of its Shahab (Meteor) – 3 missile (900 mile range) in July 1998. A July 2000 test appears to have succeeded, but a September 2000 test did not. Iran conducted an apparently successful test in late May 2002, and the Defense Department now assesses the missile as operational. Iran might have produced 10 – 20 of them, according to press reports. Iran is also trying to make a 1,200-mile range Shahab-4, but U.S. officials told journalists in late October 2002 that an Iranian test of an extended-range Shahab had failed. In March 2002, an intelligence community official upgraded the missile threat from Iran, testifying that the United States would “most likely” face an intercontinental ballistic missile threat from Iran by 2015.
Pada tahun 1998, Iran mengakui bahwa mereka telah mengembangkan senjata kimia pada tahap akhir perang Iran-Irak tahun 1980-1988, namun mengklaim bahwa mereka secara sepihak menghentikan program senjata kimia setelah perang tersebut. Laporan proliferasi AS menyatakan bahwa Iran sedang berusaha untuk memperoleh infrastruktur senjata kimia yang mandiri, bahwa Iran mungkin memiliki kemampuan untuk menyebarkan senjata biologis, dan bahwa Iran telah menimbun senjata kimia, termasuk bahan melepuh, darah, dan bahan pencekik. Catatan ini menimbulkan pertanyaan tentang kepatuhan Iran terhadap kewajibannya berdasarkan Konvensi Senjata Kimia (CWC), yang ditandatangani Iran pada tanggal 13 Januari 1993, dan diratifikasi pada tanggal 8 Juni 1997. Namun, Organisasi Pelarangan Senjata Kimia (OPCW), yang bertugas memantau konvensi tersebut, telah menunjukkan kepuasan umum terhadap kepatuhan Iran sejauh ini. OPCW mengunjungi situs-situs kimia yang dinyatakan Iran pada bulan Februari 1999, dan Iran telah membuat deklarasi yang diperlukan. Iran adalah pihak dalam Konvensi Senjata Biologis dan Toksin tahun 1972.
On the other hand, Khatemi’s thus far successful efforts to end Iran’s international isolation depend on at least the appearance of cooperation with international nonproliferation regimes. Some Iranian officials, particularly those in the foreign ministry, assert that Iran’s security is better protected through cooperation with international nonproliferation regimes and diplomatic efforts to dampen regional arms races than through WMD development. Whatever Iran’s motivations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said on several occasions that Iran is substantially in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW) has said Iran has largely complied with that convention as well. Nonetheless, Iran’s cooperation with these regimes has not diminished U.S. suspicions that Iran is covertly circumventing, or could quickly circumvent, the restrictions imposed by these conventions.
Iran has sought Russian assistance partly because of the limited alternatives and not necessarily because of strategic or ideological affinity between the two countries. Iran’s relationship with Russia is tempered by a lingering fear of Russian power and intentions.
In 1907, Russia concluded a treaty with Britain dividing Iran into spheres of control. Russian troops occupied northern Iran during World War I. Soviet troops invaded again in 1941, in concert with Britain, when Iran appeared to become sympathetic to Nazi Germany. After World War II, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw completely from Iran and it set up two autonomous zones in northern Iran, which lasted until 1946, when U.S. pressure forced the Soviets to withdraw completely. Iran’s Islamic revolution, which triumphed in February 1979, considered anathema Soviet ideology and its suppression of Islam and other religious expression. The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revived Iranian fears that Moscow might have territorial designs on Iran. The Soviet Union also backed Iraq with arms sales, financial credits, diplomatic support, and military advice, throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).
The Iran-Iraq war, which ended in August 1988, left Iran’s conventional arsenal devastated, and the need for rearmament provided Iran and the Soviet Union an opportunity to pursue mutual interests. A U.S. military buildup in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war – designed to protect the free flow of oil in the Gulf – had created concern in Moscow that the United States was attempting to establish hegemony in that strategic body. Iran, partly because of U.S. efforts during the Iran-Iraq war to shut off worldwide arms sales to Iran, lacked a wide choice of willing suppliers, and the Soviet Union saw arms sales to Iran as one way to broaden its influence in the Gulf. A February 1989 visit to Tehran by then Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze, and his meeting with the ailing Ayatollah Khomeini, signaled the beginning of a thaw in Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union.
The subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991 raised Iran’s importance in the strategic calculations of Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union in international affairs. Russia perceived an arms and technology relationship with Iran as a key part of an effort to moderate Iranian behavior on Russia’s southern flank. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and the former Communist leaders left in charge in the six Muslim states of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) were concerned that Iran might try to spread revolutionary Islam into these new states. According to observers, Russia tacitly linked arms and technology sales to Iran’s refraining from political meddling in these states.
An additional factor in Russian planning was the aftereffects of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, which left the United States pre-eminent in the Gulf and demonstrated the effectiveness of U.S. military technology. The war cemented the U.S. position as the primary arms supplier to the Persian Gulf monarchy states. U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq after its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait included a worldwide arms embargo, removing one of the key Soviet arms clients from the international market. Russian officials viewed Iran as a key source of needed new sales to compensate for the closure of these and other arms markets.
Attempting to curb Russia’s arms and technology relationships with Iran, U.S. officials have consistently impressed upon their Russian counterparts the possibility that Iran’s historic resentment of past Russian actions in Iran might some day make Russia itself a target of Iranian WMD. Iran and Russia are also wary of each others’ ambitions and claims on Caspian Sea energy resources, even though their positions on the division of resources in the sea have differed little to date. (The two countries, along with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, border the sea.) These arguments have not dissuaded Russia from selling arms and technology to Iran, and the Clinton Administration and Congress tried to use the threat of sanctions in efforts to achieve nonproliferation goals.
In a few cases, the Clinton Administration took the step of imposing sanctions on Russian entities dealing with Iran, although it was reluctant to sanction the Russian government, maintaining that the United States has broad objectives in Russia. Those objectives included promoting economic and political reform, mutual arms control and reduction, safeguarding nuclear material, and limiting the effects of the war in Chechnya. During 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration worked constructively with Russia to try to contain the Islamist threat posed by the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and its protected “guest,” Saudi-born terrorist financier Osama bin Laden. These objectives, according to some observers, sometimes overrode calls within and outside the Administration to closely link U.S. relations with Russia to the abandonment of its arms and technology relationship with Iran.
Seperti pendahulunya, Pemerintahan Bush enggan mengambil risiko hubungan yang lebih luas dengan Rusia sehubungan dengan masalah Iran dan enggan memberikan sanksi kepada pemerintah Rusia. Beberapa entitas Rusia telah dikenai sanksi atas penjualan teknologi terkait senjata ke negara sponsor terorisme lainnya: Libya, Sudan, dan Suriah. Keengganan Pemerintahan Bush untuk mengkritik keras Rusia mengenai isu-isu proliferasi telah terlihat jelas sejak serangan 11 September 2001. Rusia telah membantu Amerika Serikat dalam menanggapi serangan tersebut, terutama persetujuannya terhadap penggunaan pangkalan AS di Asia Tengah untuk upaya perang di Afghanistan.
Both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations have sanctioned Russian entities under this provision for arms sales to other state sponsors of terrorism. In April 1999, the Clinton Administration sanctioned three Russian entities under this provision for arms sales to Syria, but the Russian government was not sanctioned. In September 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions under this provision on three Russian entities for sales to Libya, Sudan, and Syria, while electing not to sanction the Russian government. The three entities sanctioned in September 2002 are the Tula Design Bureau of Instrument Building; the State Scientific Product Enterprise, Bazalt; and Rostov Air Frame Plant 168.
Since late 1996, U.S. officials and published reports have cited Russia, which has been a formal member of the MTCR since August 8, 1995, as a primary supplier of Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Press reports and U.S. official statements and reports since 1997 have indicated that Russian entities have provided Iran’s missile programs with training, testing equipment, and components including specialty steels and alloys, tungsten coated graphite, gyroscopes and other guidance technology, rocket engine and fuel technology, laser equipment, machine tools, and maintenance manuals.
The Russian technology assistance to Iran frustrated Clinton Administration and Congress. Through a combination of engagement and selected imposition of sanctions, the Clinton Administration and Congress sought to enlist greater Russian government cooperation in halting the technology flow, with mixed success. Critics in Congress took a different view, arguing for broad and sustained application of sanctions on Russia and its entities on the grounds that the Russian government has been insincere in its pledges to crack down on technology exports to Iran by its entities.
The bill also included a provision, not contained in the earlier version, that banned U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space station unless the President can certify that the agency or entities under the Agency’s control had not transferred any WMD or missile-related technology to Iran within the year prior. The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts who will use the space station and for certain space station hardware. In his statement upon signing the bill into law, the President noted that Russia “continues to be a valued partner in the International Space Station.” On October 16, 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) testified before a House International Relations Committee oversight hearing on implementation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. The U.S. space agency indicated that it has continued extraordinary payments to Russian entities for work on the space station under an exemption in the Act allowing for payments to ensure space crew safety (Section 6F).
Available evidence suggests that some Russian assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs continues. In its report for Congress in January 2002, the CIA said “Russian entities during the period (first half of 2001) continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile related goods and know how to countries such as Iran, Libya, India, and China.” The Bush Administration has not added any Russian entities to those already sanctioned for WMD technology sales to Iran.
Since January 1995, when Iran signed an $800 million contract with Russia for the completion of the 1,000 megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, the U.S. Administration and Congress have been concerned about the potential for Iran to use the project to advance a nuclear weapons program. Although the work on Bushehr is far behind its original schedule, Russia asserts that the project will be operational by 2005. Iranian technicians have begun nuclear plant operations training in Russia. In July 2002, Russia raised U.S. concerns by floating a plan to build five more reactors in Iran over the next ten years; U.S. pressure contributed to Russia’s backtracking on the plan and its subsequent statements that the expanded project might not go forward.
Keputusan Pemerintahan Clinton yang lebih mengandalkan keterlibatan daripada hukuman terhadap Rusia, sebuah kebijakan yang dilanjutkan oleh Pemerintahan Bush, telah membuahkan beberapa manfaat. Pemerintahan Clinton memperoleh janji Rusia untuk tidak memasok Iran dengan teknologi apa pun yang dapat berkontribusi pada program senjata nuklir, termasuk peralatan pengayaan uranium. Pada bulan September 2000, Pemerintahan Clinton berhasil membujuk Rusia untuk memblokir penjualan perangkat laser ke Iran oleh salah satu pusat penelitiannya yang menurut Amerika Serikat hanya akan digunakan Iran untuk program senjata nuklir. Dalam diplomasi regional, Pemerintahan Clinton menghadapi kemunduran pada proyek Bushehr pada bulan Maret 1998 ketika Menteri Luar Negeri Albright yang berkunjung membuat perjanjian dengan Ukraina yang berjanji untuk menghentikan penjualan turbin untuk reaktor tersebut. Pada pertengahan tahun 2002, sebagai tanggapan atas kekhawatiran AS, Rusia menyelesaikan perjanjian dengan Iran agar Rusia dapat memproses ulang bahan bakar nuklir bekas dari proyek Bushehr.
U.S. official statements on efforts to dissuade Russian WMD-related technology sales generally omit discussion of chemical or biological technology. U.S. statements note that outside assistance to Iran’s chemical and biological program is “difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials, the equipment being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these items.” The relative absence of public discussion could, alternately, suggest that the provision of Russian chemical or biological technology to Iran has not reached the level at which intense U.S. diplomatic pressure has been deemed warranted.
Iran and China have not been close ideologically or politically, but Iran was never occupied or invaded by China’s troops and Iran does not fear China’s long-term ambitions as Iran might fear those of Russia. Under the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran cut diplomatic relations with China after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949. As PRC-Soviet relations worsened in the late 1960s and the 1970s, relations thawed as China saw a strong Iran – even though it was governed by the pro-U.S., anti-Communist Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – as an obstacle to Soviet aims to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf, according to articles in China’s press during that period. After the fall of the Shah at the hands of the Islamic revolution in February 1979, Iran-China relations warmed further. In January 1980, China abstained on a U.N. Security Council vote to sanction Iran for the November 4, 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.
Pada bulan Mei 1989, Presiden saat itu (sekarang Pemimpin Tertinggi) Ali Khamene’i mengunjungi Tiongkok untuk memperkuat hubungan pertahanan dan politik Tiongkok-Iran. Alasan strategis Iran membeli senjata dan teknologi dari Tiongkok, antara lain, untuk melawan tekanan AS terhadap Iran dengan membangun aliansi dengan negara-negara besar lainnya. Tiongkok memandang penjualan senjata ke Iran mungkin sebagai sarana untuk mengalihkan sebagian pasukan militer AS dari wilayah dekat Taiwan dan mungkin sebagai balasan atas berlanjutnya penjualan senjata AS ke Taiwan. Pihak lain mencatat bahwa Tiongkok tidak membina Iran secara eksklusif, namun berupaya memperluas pengaruhnya secara luas di Timur Tengah. Mereka yang menganut pandangan ini berpendapat bahwa Tiongkok menjaga hubungan baik dengan negara-negara Arab moderat termasuk Arab Saudi dan Mesir. Beberapa ahli menganggap kepentingan Tiongkok di Iran lebih sempit: Tiongkok ingin menjamin pasokan minyak untuk memenuhi pertumbuhan ekonominya, dan memperoleh pendapatan dari penjualan senjata dan teknologi ke Iran.
As in the Russia case, the United States has a broad agenda with the PRC. Aside from nonproliferation issues, the high priority issues on the U.S.-China agenda include: encouraging a peaceful resolution of the dispute between the PRC and Taiwan, U.S.-PRC trade relations, and China’s human rights record. The Clinton Administration maintained that it needed to keep the broader issues in mind when faced with a decision whether or not to impose sanctions on China for its relations with Iran. Some, particularly those who believe the United States should do more to contain the PRC’s growing strategic power, argued that the Clinton Administration was too willing to accept China’s nonproliferation pledges at face value. Some in Congress have taken this latter view and want to ensure that China is sanctioned if it provides WMD-related technology to Iran. The Clinton Administration efforts slowed China’s cooperation with Iranian WMD programs in some areas. However, a visit to China by President Khatemi in June 2000 raised U.S. fears that new WMD or weapons cooperation would be agreed between Iran and China, but both countries strongly denied that the visit involved or resulted in new military cooperation agreements.
The Bush Administration has sanctioned a relatively large number of China’s entities for proliferation activities with Iran, even as the Bush Administration has cultivated China as a partner in the overall war on terrorism spawned by the September 11, 2001 attacks. This, combined with U.S. government reports over the past few years, suggests that China continues to provide advanced conventional arms and WMD-related technology to Iran. Then leader of China Jiang Zemin visited Iran in April 2002 and signed agreements covering, according to official Iranian and Chinese statements, oil, gas, trade, transportation, educational and cultural exchange, and information technology. It is not known from open sources whether or not WMD or arms related technology transfers were discussed.
Masalah sanksi terhadap penjualan C-802 dan C-801 mereda ketika Tiongkok berjanji kepada Menteri Luar Negeri Albright pada bulan September 1997, dan sekali lagi kepada Menteri Pertahanan Cohen pada bulan Januari 1998, bahwa Tiongkok akan menghentikan penjualan lebih lanjut C-802 dan C-801 ke Iran. Para pejabat AS mengatakan bahwa Tiongkok menjunjung janji ini.
Recent U.S. CIA and DoD proliferation reports have said that entities in China continue to supply ballistic missile-related technology and advice to Iran’s Shahab missile program. In the mid-1990s, there were numerous press reports, such as a November 21, 1996 Washington Times report quoting U.S. intelligence sources, that China had sold Iran guidance technology (gyroscopes and accelerometers), special steel suited to missile fabrication, and missiles equipment, possibly for use in the Shahab program. There have been no confirmed deliveries of entire M-9 or M-11 ballistic missiles to Iran, both of which are considered to have range/payload combinations that are covered by MTCR guidelines.
The Clinton Administration tried to limit China’s missile assistance to Iran primarily through diplomatic engagement. On November 22, 1996, and again on September 10, 1997, the State Department said the United States had not determined that China had violated its March 1992 commitment to adhere to the terms of the MTCR. In March 1998, the Clinton Administration reportedly offered China expanded cooperation on commercial space ventures in return for an end to all Chinese assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs and its joining the MTCR. In November 2000, the Clinton Administration negotiated an agreement with China under which China issued (November 21, 2000) a public statement that it would not assist other countries’ efforts to develop ballistic missiles and that it would adopt a control regime for exports of technology that could be used for ballistic missiles. The U.S. insistence that China join the MTCR was dropped, and the Clinton Administration said it would not sanction China for past missile assistance to Iran or Pakistan and that U.S.-China commercial space cooperation would resume. Simultaneously, recipient entities in Pakistan and Iran (the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, the Armed Forces Logistics Command, and the Defense Industries Organization) were sanctioned, although the sanctions (a ban on U.S. trade with and exports to the sanctioned entities) were already in force under broader U.S. sanctions laws and regulations on Iran.
Pemerintahan Bush telah memberikan sanksi kepada beberapa entitas Tiongkok yang tampaknya terlibat dalam kegiatan proliferasi rudal, meskipun pernyataan dan laporan Pemerintah umumnya mencantumkan sejumlah entitas tanpa secara spesifik mengidentifikasi jenis peralatan yang ditransfer atau program yang dibantu oleh Iran. Sanksi tersebut dijatuhkan pada 16 Januari 2002, 9 Mei 2002, dan 9 Juli 2002, berdasarkan peraturan yang berlaku termasuk Undang-Undang Nonproliferasi Senjata Iran-Irak dan Undang-Undang Nonproliferasi Iran. Banyak nama entitas yang terkena sanksi tampaknya saling menduplikasi, sehingga mencerminkan informasi yang tidak tepat mengenai nama sebenarnya dari entitas yang diduga mentransfer teknologi ke Iran. Dalam kasus lain, entitas yang terkena sanksi diulangi secara berturut-turut, yang menunjukkan bahwa entitas tersebut mungkin terlibat dalam beberapa program senjata pemusnah massal Iran. Untuk daftar entitas yang terkena sanksi, lihat Daftar Federal: 24 Januari 2002; 16 Mei 2002; dan 25 Juli 2002, saat sanksi ini diumumkan.
The Bush Administration clearly believes that entities in China are assisting Iran’s chemical weapons program. In four separate determinations, the Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on several chemical firms based in China – June 14, 2001; January 16, 2002; May 9, 2002; and July 9, 2002. In the first three cases, the sanctions were imposed pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. In the latest case, sanctions were imposed pursuant to the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and the nonproliferation provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. One firm sanctioned by the Bush Administration is the Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export Corporation, the same firm sanctioned by the previous administration. Other sanctioned entities with names that clearly indicate their involvement in the chemical industry include: Liyang Chemical Equipment Company, and the Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant.
Over the past decade, North Korea and Iran have been further drawn together by U.S. references to both of them as “rogue states” and as targets of U.S. economic sanctions. As noted above, both of them, along with Iraq, were designated by President Bush as part of “an axis of evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message. At the same time, North Korea has deflected some scrutiny by emphasizing that it is not a Muslim nation and asserting that it has no connections to Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or those backed by Iran. Iran, by contrast, has been identified by the United States for over a decade as the most active state sponsor of terrorism because of its backing for Islamic terrorist organizations such as Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, a Palestinian organization.
Meskipun Presiden Bush menggambarkan Korea Utara sebagai bagian dari poros kejahatan pada awal tahun 2002, pada akhir tahun tersebut pemerintahan AS tampaknya lebih bergerak ke arah kebijakan keterlibatan dengan Korea Utara yang diikuti oleh pemerintahan Clinton. Kebijakan tersebut dibahas secara lebih rinci di bawah ini, dalam konteks upaya Pemerintahan Clinton untuk memperluas perjanjian kerangka kerja Oktober 1994 mengenai isu-isu nuklir hingga menghentikan pengujian rudal dan ekspor rudal Korea Utara (ke Iran dan negara-negara lain). Namun, pada akhir tahun 2002, perasaan krisis berkembang ketika Korea Utara mengakui sedang mengerjakan jalur pengayaan uranium hingga senjata nuklir, dan kemudian membatalkan program plutoniumnya yang telah ditangguhkan berdasarkan perjanjian kerangka kerja pada bulan Oktober 1994. Korea Utara mengusir inspektur IAEA yang memantau perjanjian tersebut pada bulan Desember 2002.
The sense of crisis developed at the same time as there were revelations of two previously unknown nuclear sites in Iran, as note above. Although the separate Iran and North Korea revelations coincided in time, there was nothing to indicate that Iran and North Korea are working together on nuclear weapons technology.
Keterlibatan Pemerintahan Clinton dengan Korea Utara dimulai secara bertahap pada tahun 1994 dengan upaya AS untuk menghentikan program nuklir Korea Utara dan, kemudian, pengembangan rudal yang mampu menyerang Amerika Serikat. Pemerintahan Clinton berusaha untuk memperluas perjanjian di bidang ini dengan tujuan tambahan untuk membatasi hubungan teknologi rudal balistik Korea Utara dengan Iran dan negara-negara lain. Pada bulan Mei 1999, utusan AS untuk Korea Utara, mantan Menteri Pertahanan William Perry, dilaporkan menawarkan pencabutan sanksi AS terhadap Korea Utara sebagai imbalan atas penghentian pengujian rudal dan diakhirinya ekspor teknologi rudal ke Timur Tengah dan Pakistan. Pada bulan Juli 2000, pembicaraan AS-Korea Utara mengenai ekspor rudal tersendat ketika Amerika Serikat menolak permintaan Korea Utara agar negara tersebut menerima $1 miliar per tahun selama tiga tahun sebagai kompensasi atas penghentian ekspor. Pemerintahan Clinton tampaknya berada di ambang perjanjian nonproliferasi luas dengan Korea Utara sebelum Presiden Clinton meninggalkan jabatannya, namun belum ada kesepakatan yang diselesaikan. Karena beberapa masalah nonproliferasi tidak terselesaikan pada akhir masa jabatannya, Presiden Clinton tidak melanjutkan kunjungannya ke Korea Utara pada akhir masa jabatannya.
Despite U.S. efforts to halt North Korean exports of technology to the Middle East, by all accounts North Korean assistance to Iranian weapons programs is continuing. The CIA proliferation report of January 2002 said that entities in North Korea continue to supply crucial ballistic missile-related equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran. The Clinton Administration again sanctioned the Changgwang entity for missile proliferation to Iran on January 2, 2001, and the Bush Administration sanctioned Changgwang for similar activity yet again on June 14, 2001. Both latter sanctions were imposed pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
Informasi mengenai upaya Iran untuk memperoleh senjata dan teknologi dari pemasok lain masih kurang jelas, dan menunjukkan bahwa Iran bersedia berurusan dengan sejumlah pemasok dan perantara untuk memperoleh teknologi yang dibutuhkan. Sebagian besar pemasok ke Iran memiliki peralatan dan teknologi bekas blok Soviet yang dapat menggantikan, melengkapi, atau melengkapi teknologi yang diperoleh Iran dari Rusia. Namun, Iran tidak membatasi pembeliannya hanya pada negara-negara bekas blok Soviet; mereka terus berupaya, menurut laporan terbaru CIA kepada Kongres, untuk mendekati entitas di Eropa Barat untuk mendapatkan senjata pemusnah massal dan teknologi rudal. Contoh utama pemasok ke Iran, selain tiga negara pemasok utamanya, adalah sebagai berikut:
